Conformity and bounded rationality in games with many players

Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders

No 269571, Economic Research Papers from University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Abstract: Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large " must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where " can be chosen to be small.

Keywords: Public Economics; Research Methods/Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2003-10-20
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players (2003)
Working Paper: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwarer:269571

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.269571

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