Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players

Edward Cartwright and Myrna Wooders

The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) from University of Warwick, Department of Economics

Abstract: Intepret a set of players all playing the same pure strategy and all with similar attributes as a society. Is it consistent with self interested behaviour for a population to organise itself into a relatively small number of societies? In a companion paper we characterized how large " must be, in terms of parameters describing individual games, for an equilibrium to exhibit conformity in pure strategies. In this paper we provide a wide class of games where such conformity is boundedly rational, that is, where " can be chosen to be small.

Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Conformity and bounded rationality in games with many players (2003)
Working Paper: Conformity and Bounded Rationality in Games with Many Players (2003)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wrk:warwec:687

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