The Optimal Mechanism For Selling To Budget-Constrained Consumers

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale

No 292704, SSRI Workshop Series from University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute

Abstract: This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget-constrained. Unlike the standard case, where buyers are not budget-constrained, a single posted price is not optimal. An optimal mechanism generally consists of a continuum of lotteries indexed by the probability of consumption and the entry fee.

Keywords: Research; Methods/; Statistical; Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 1995-04
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/292704/files/uwmad-0054.PDF (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (1996)
Working Paper: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (1995)
Working Paper: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:uwssri:292704

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.292704

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