The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers

Yeon-Koo Che and Ian Gale

Working papers from Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems

Abstract: This paper finds an optimal mechanism for selling an indivisible good to consumers who may be budget-constrained. Unlike the case where buyers are not budget constrained, a single posted price is not typically optimal. An optimal mechanism generally consists of a continuum of lotteries indexed by the probability of comsumption and the entry fee.

Keywords: CONSUMPTION; MONOPOLIES; INFORMATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D40 D42 D80 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Optimal Mechanism For Selling To Budget-Constrained Consumers (1995)
Working Paper: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (1995)
Working Paper: The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to Budget-Constrained Consumers (1994)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:att:wimass:9609

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