Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-Based Evidence From Meiji Japan

Eric Weese, Masayoshi Hayashi and Masashi Nishikawa

No 211545, Center Discussion Papers from Yale University, Economic Growth Center

Abstract: Does the exercise of the right of self-determination lead to inefficiency? This paper considers a set of centrally planned municipal mergers during the Meiji period, with data from Gifu prefecture. The observed merger pattern can be explained as a social optimum based on a very simple indiidual utility function. If individual villages had been allowed to choose their merger partners, counterfactual simulations show that the core is always non-empty, but core partitions contain about 80% more (post-merger) municipalities than the social optimum. Simulations are possible because core partitions can be calculated using repeated application of a mixed integer program.

Keywords: Political Economy; Public Economics; Research Methods/ Statistical Methods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 98
Date: 2015-08
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/211545/files/japan7.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-based evidence from Meiji Japan (2016)
Working Paper: Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-Based Evidence From Meiji Japan (2015)
Working Paper: Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-based Evidence from Meiji Japan (2015)
Working Paper: Inefficiency and Self-Determination: Simulation-based Evidence from Meiji Japan (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ags:yaleeg:211545

DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.211545

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