Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms

Hassan Benchekroun, Charles Figuieres and Mabel Tidball ()

No 1637, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: Our paper proposes an original angle to study the free-rider problem in the provision of public goods when the regulator has no information about agents' preferences. For a given outcome - specifically a Lindahl allocation - we ask what assumptions have to be imposed on simple mechanisms (in a precisely defined sense) that have the ability to Nash-implement it. Our answer lies in two main results: i) transfers necessarily belongs to a class of mechanisms that are linear in individual contributions to the public good, ii) there exists a subset of this class that fully implement Lindahl allocations. This subset encompasses, but does not reduce to, Walker (1981).

Keywords: Lindahl allocations; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D62 D82 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2016-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
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Working Paper: Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1637

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