Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms
Hassan Benchekroun (),
Charles Figuieres () and
Mabel Tidball ()
Working Papers from HAL
Our paper proposes an original angle to study the free-rider problem in the provision of public goods when the regulator has no information about agents' preferences. For a given outcome - specifically a Lindahl allocation - we ask what assumptions have to be imposed on simple mechanisms (in a precisely defined sense) that have the ability to Nash-implement it. Our answer lies in two main results: i) transfers necessarily belongs to a class of mechanisms that are linear in individual contributions to the public good, ii) there exists a subset of this class that fully implement Lindahl allocations. This subset encompasses, but does not reduce to, Walker (1981).
Keywords: Lindahl allocations; mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Implementation of the Lindahl Correspondance via Simple Indirect Mechanisms (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01378460
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