Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat
Anne-Sarah Chiambretto () and
Additional contact information
Anne-Sarah Chiambretto: Aix-Marseille Univ. (Aix-Marseille School of Economics), CNRS, EHESS and Centrale Marseille, http://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/en
No 1712, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France
We investigate the possibility for governance authorities to avoid a large part of regulatory costs, by simply backing up social norms with a threat of collective punishment. Specifically, we consider the case of fisheries in which the regulatory cap is to sustain an optimal conservation level. We identify a mandatory regulation such that, when it is used as a threat, it ensures that the cap is voluntarily implemented. The mandatory scheme is based on a incentive mechanism which secures the returns of the harvester, and a tax on potential capacity. From the status of mere threat, this mandatory regulation takes time to be enforced though. We show that such a tax scheme, even if it is applied randomly after the first occurrence of a deviation from the optimal conservation level, ensures voluntary compliance, provided a suitable choice of the capacity tax. We study the properties of this tax scheme and build an example using data on the scallop fishery in the Saint-Brieuc Bay (France) to illustrate our point.
Keywords: voluntary agreements; fisheries; conservation policies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q22 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat (2017)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:1712
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France AMU-AMSE - 5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille Cedex 1. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gregory Cornu ().