Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat
Anne-Sarah Chiambretto and
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Anne-Sarah Chiambretto: GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - ECM - Ecole Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales
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We investigate the possibility for governance authorities to avoid a large part of regulatory costs, by simply backing up social norms with a threat of collective punishment. Specifically, we consider the case of fisheries in which the regulatory cap is to sustain an optimal conservation level. We identify a mandatory regulation such that, when it is used as a threat, it ensures that the cap is voluntarily implemented. The mandatory scheme is based on a incentive mechanism which secures the returns of the harvester, and a tax on potential capacity. From the status of mere threat, this mandatory regulation takes time to be enforced though. We show that such a tax scheme, even if it is applied randomly after the first occurrence of a deviation from the optimal conservation level, ensures voluntary compliance, provided a suitable choice of the capacity tax. We study the properties of this tax scheme and build an example using data on the scallop fishery in the Saint-Brieuc Bay (France) to illustrate our point.
Keywords: conservation policies; fisheries; voluntary agreements (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Voluntary Management of Fisheries under an Uncertain Background Legislative Threat (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01500543
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