Matching with Recall

Yann Bramoullé, Brian W. Rogers () and Erdem Yenerdag ()
Additional contact information
Brian W. Rogers: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, https://economics.wustl.edu/people/brian-rogers
Erdem Yenerdag: Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, https://economics.wustl.edu/people/erdem-yenerdag

No 2203, AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France

Abstract: We study a two-period one-to-one dynamic matching environment in which agents meet randomly and decide whether to match early or defer. Crucially, agents can match with either partner in the second period. This "recall" captures situations where, e.g., a firm and worker can conduct additional interviews before contracting. Recall has a profound impact on incentives and on aggregate outcomes. We show that the likelihood to match early is nonmonotonic in type: early matches occur between the good-but-not-best agents. The option value provided by the first-period partner provides a force against unraveling, so that deferrals occur under small participation costs.

Keywords: dynamic matching; unraveling; recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2022-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-cta, nep-des and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.amse-aixmarseille.fr/sites/default/fil ... /wp_2022_-_nr_03.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Matching with Recall (2022)
Working Paper: Matching with Recall (2022)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aim:wpaimx:2203

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in AMSE Working Papers from Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France AMU-AMSE - 5-9 Boulevard Maurice Bourdet, CS 50498 - 13205 Marseille Cedex 1. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Gregory Cornu ().