Matching with Recall

Yann Bramoullé, Brian Rogers () and Erdem Yenerdag ()
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Brian Rogers: WUSTL - Washington University in Saint Louis
Erdem Yenerdag: WUSTL - Washington University in Saint Louis

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Abstract: We study a two-period one-to-one dynamic matching environment in which agents meet randomly and decide whether to match early or defer. Crucially, agents can match with either partner in the second period. This "recall" captures situations where, e.g., a firm and worker can conduct additional interviews before contracting. Recall has a profound impact on incentives and on aggregate outcomes. We show that the likelihood to match early is nonmonotonic in type: early matches occur between the good-but-not-best agents. The option value provided by the first-period partner provides a force against unraveling, so that deferrals occur under small participation costs.

Keywords: dynamic matching; unraveling; recall (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Matching with Recall (2022)
Working Paper: Matching with Recall (2022)
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