Information Design in Cheap Talk

Qianjun Lyu and Wing Suen
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Qianjun Lyu: University of Bonn

No 199, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent preferences that will determine the sender’s optimal experiment, and give sufficient conditions for information design to be valuable or not under different payoff structures. These conditions depend more on marginal incentives—how payoffs vary with the state—than on the alignment of sender’s and receiver’s rankings over actions within a state.

Keywords: Information design; cheap talk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45 pages
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econtribute.de/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_199_2022.pdf First version, 2022 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information Design in Cheap Talk (2024)
Working Paper: Information Design in Cheap Talk (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:199

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