Why Bans Fail: Tipping Points and Australia’s Social Media Ban

Leonardo Bursztyn (), Angela Duckworth (), Rafael Jiménez-Durán (), Aaron Leonard (), Filip Milojević (), Christopher Roth () and Cass R. Sunstein ()
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Leonardo Bursztyn: University of Chicago & NBER
Angela Duckworth: University of Pennsylvania
Rafael Jiménez-Durán: Bocconi University, IGIER, CEPR, CESifo, & Stigler Center
Aaron Leonard: University of Chicago
Filip Milojević: University of Chicago
Christopher Roth: University of Cologne, ECONtribute, NHH Norwegian School of Economics, MPI for Behavioral Economics, & CEPR
Cass R. Sunstein: Harvard Law School

No 406, ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series from University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany

Abstract: In December 2025, Australia became the first country to ban youth under 16 years old from holding accounts on major social media platforms, a policy now under consideration in more than a dozen countries and in numerous states. Because social media use is inherently social, the effectiveness of a ban that is easy to circumvent may depend on whether compliance reaches a tipping point: a share of compliant peers high enough to make it optimal for individuals to comply themselves. We surveyed 746 Australian teenagers four months after the ban took effect and find that only about one in four 14–15-year-olds comply. The social environment around use has barely moved: most banned teens believe that their peers are still using banned platforms and cite social reasons for continuing use. Sustaining high compliance requires two ingredients: the share of compliers must be high enough and those who comply must find it preferable to continue complying. The current ban achieves neither. Teenagers report that they require roughly two-thirds of peers to stop using social media to stop themselves, far above the share currently complying. They also perceive compliers as less popular than non-compliers, so the more influential teens disproportionately stay on the platforms. Together, these patterns suggest that compliance is more likely to diminish than to rise. Sustaining higher compliance will likely require pairing the ban with instruments that act on social norms and individual incentives directly.

Keywords: Social media ban; tipping points; coordination; compliance; network effects; peer effects; social norms; adolescents; technology regulation; Australia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D85 D91 I18 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2026-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-soc
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