Gender- and Frame-specific Audience Effects in Dictator Games

Jonathan Alevy (), Francis Jeffries () and Yonggang Lu ()
Additional contact information
Francis Jeffries: College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage
Yonggang Lu: College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage

No 2013-02, Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study dictator allocations using a 2x2 experimental design that varies the level of anonymity and the choice set, allowing observation of audience effects in both give and take frames. Changes in the distribution of responses across treatment cells allow us to distinguish among alternative motives as elaborated in recent theory. We observe significant audience effects that vary by both frame and gender. The pattern of responses suggests that heterogeneous concerns for reputation and self-signaling across gender give rise to the contextual effects associated with the give and take frames that have previously been observed in the literature .

Keywords: Dictator game; anonymity; gender; framing. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 D01 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-hpe
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Citations:

Forthcoming Economics Letters

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http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA201302.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Gender- and frame-specific audience effects in dictator games (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ala:wpaper:2013-02

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