EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The Endogenous Formation of Common Pool Resource Coalitions

Carlos Chavez (), James Murphy (), Felipe Quezada () and John Stranlund ()

No 2021-01, Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a theoretical model of endogenous CPR coalition formation in which the resource is co-defended with costly monitoring by coalition members and sanctions for encroachment imposed by the government. We demonstrate that CPR coalitions can form even when monitoring is so costly that coalition members choose not to monitor for encroachment, but the coalitions will be relatively small. Larger coalitions will form if monitoring costs are low enough to yield effective deterrence. We tested the results of the model using lab-in-field experiments with fishers who were members of Chile’s territorial use rights fisheries (TURFs) and in the lab with Chilean university students. We find that fishers frequently formed CPR coalitions, even when they could not deter outsider poaching. Fishers usually formed the grand coalition when the monitoring cost was low, but they formed smaller coalitions when monitoring was more costly. Fishers invested in monitoring frequently and these investments reduced poaching. Relative to open access, when coalitions formed, total harvest effort was curtailed and earnings for coalition members generally increased. Students formed coalitions less frequently, these coalitions tended to be small, and they infrequently invested in monitoring, even when it was profitable to do so. Consequently, student coalition member earnings were not better off on average than under open access.

Keywords: experimental economics, Common pool resources; enforcement; field experiments; poaching; territorial use rights fisheries; social dilemma; fisheries management; development economics; co-enforcement; coalition formation; encroachment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 C93 D70 H40 K42 Q22 Q28 Q56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-env, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-lam and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econpapers.uaa.alaska.edu/RePEC/ala/wpaper/ALA202101.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ala:wpaper:2021-01

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Alaska Anchorage, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Jonathan Alevy ().

 
Page updated 2023-01-24
Handle: RePEc:ala:wpaper:2021-01