A tractable evolutionary model for the Minority Game with asymmetric payoffs

Pietro Dindo

No 04-17, CeNDEF Working Papers from Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance

Abstract: We set up a simple behavioral model for a large population of agents who are repeatedly playing the Minority Game and whose interaction is modeled by means of the so-called replicator dynamics. This allows us to specify the dynamics of the aggregate variables, the number of agents choosing each side, in terms of a low-dimensional dynamical system that gives qualitatively the same results of the existing computational approaches. As an extension we introduce asymmetric payoffs, that is, we analyze the case where the minority and majority payoffs are side dependent. In this case the fluctuations out of the equilibrium are qualitatively different. In particular, contrary to the previous case, they are associated with a difference in the average payoff gained by each side. Furthermore, a parameter region exists where the dynamics does not converge to any isolated periodic attractor.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://cendef.uva.nl/binaries/content/assets/subsi ... 17.pdf?1417180876344 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A tractable evolutionary model for the Minority Game with asymmetric payoffs (2005)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:04-17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CeNDEF Working Papers from Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance Dept. of Economics and Econometrics, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roetersstraat 11, NL - 1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Cees C.G. Diks ().