The Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements in the case of Stock Pollution

Aart de Zeeuw, Stephen Polasky and Florian Wagener

No 11-02, CeNDEF Working Papers from Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance

Abstract: Most of the literature on stability of International Environmental Agreements is essen- tially static and can therefore not identify changes in the size of the stable coalition in connection with changes in the stock of pollutants. This is a relevant issue because most global pollution problems are dynamic with stock externalities. This paper shows that the incentives for membership indeed change with changes in the stock of pollutants and that technology choice is an important factor when considering the consequences.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:11-02

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