Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations

Aart de Zeeuw and M. Ochea ()
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M. Ochea: University of Amsterdam

No 13-09, CeNDEF Working Papers from Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance

Abstract: We study the evolutionary success of a generalised trigger strategy within an asymmetric, n-player Prisoner's Dilemma environment, with application to the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space - i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction - such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.

Date: 2013
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