The impact of pooling and sharing broadcast rights in professional team sports

Stefan Kesenne

Working Papers from University of Antwerp, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: In this theoretical analysis, we try to find out what the implications are of pooling and sharing broadcast rights in a sports league. We concentrate on the impact on talent demand, competitive balance and ticket price, using a simplified 2-club non-cooperative Nash equilibrium model with the hiring of talent as the only decision variable, as well as a more general competitive equilibrium model with a large number of teams in the league and with talent hiring and ticket price as decision variables. The main conclusion is that the case for pooling and sharing broadcast rights is not very strong if clubs are profit maximisers. Decentralised selling and performance-based distribution of the rights seems to be the most promising scenario to improve the competitive balance. If clubs are win maximisers, the sharing of broadcast money always improve the competitive balance, but the monopolisation of the broadcast rights by the league is not necessary for sharing.

Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-spo
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://repository.uantwerpen.be/docman/irua/9613b8/cd29abe1.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: The Impact of Pooling and Sharing Broadcast Rights in Professional Team Sports (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ant:wpaper:2008009

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