Variable Population Manipulations of Reallocation Rules in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences

Agustín Bonifacio

No 223, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of monotonic reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowments-merging-proof, at least one is endowments-splittingproof and that no such rule is pre-delivery-prof.

Keywords: single-peakedness; withdrawal-proofness; endowments-merging-proofness; endowments-splitting-proofness; pre-delivery-proofness. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D63 D71 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2023-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/223.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences (2024)
Working Paper: Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:aoz:wpaper:223

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