Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences

Agustín Bonifacio

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a one-commodity economy with single-peaked preferences and individual endowments, we study different ways in which reallocation rules can be strategically distorted by affecting the set of active agents. We introduce and characterize the family of monotonic reallocation rules and show that each rule in this class is withdrawal-proof and endowments-merging-proof, at least one is endowments-splitting-proof and that no such rule is pre-delivery-proof.

Date: 2022-10, Revised 2023-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Variable population manipulations of reallocation rules in economies with single-peaked preferences (2024)
Working Paper: Variable Population Manipulations of Reallocation Rules in Economies with Single-Peaked Preferences (2023)
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