On Voting Rules Satisfying False-Name-Proofness and Participation

Agustín Bonifacio and Federico Fioravanti
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Federico Fioravanti: Saint Etienne School of Economics

No 356, Working Papers from Red Nacional de Investigadores en Economía (RedNIE)

Abstract: We consider voting rules in settings where voters’ identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identitiesor abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called false-nameproofness and participation, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply anonymity and are incompatible with neutrality. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both of these properties cannot be met by onto and object neutral rules that also satisfy the topsonly criterion. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties.

Keywords: false-name-proofness; participation; voting; tops-only; anonymity; neutrality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 17 pages
Date: 2025-03
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https://rednie.eco.unc.edu.ar/files/DT/356.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation (2025)
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