On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation

Agustín Bonifacio and Federico Fioravanti

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Abstract: We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation}, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply \emph{anonymity} and are incompatible with \emph{neutrality}. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both \emph{false-name-proofness} and \emph{participation} cannot be met by rules that are also \emph{onto}, \emph{object neutral}, and \emph{tops-only}. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties.

Date: 2025-03, Revised 2026-05
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.02740 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On Voting Rules Satisfying False-Name-Proofness and Participation (2025)
Working Paper: On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation (2025)
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