On voting rules satisfying false-name-proofness and participation

Agustín Bonifacio and Federico Fioravanti

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Abstract: We consider voting rules in settings where voters' identities are difficult to verify. Voters can manipulate the process by casting multiple votes under different identities or abstaining from voting. Immunities to such manipulations are called false-name-proofness and participation, respectively. For the universal domain of (strict) preferences, these properties together imply anonymity and are incompatible with neutrality. For the domain of preferences defined over all subsets of a given set of objects, both of these properties cannot be met by onto and object neutral rules that also satisfy the tops-only criterion. However, when preferences over subsets of objects are restricted to be separable, all these properties can be satisfied. Furthermore, the domain of separable preferences is maximal for these properties.

Date: 2025-03
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http://arxiv.org/pdf/2503.02740 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: On Voting Rules Satisfying False-Name-Proofness and Participation (2025)
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