Gender differences in an endogenous timing conflict game
Philip Grossman (),
Jean Paul Rabanal and
Olga Rud ()
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Jean Paul Rabanal: Monash University
No 141, Working Papers from Peruvian Economic Association
We conduct a laboratory experiment to study the role of gender on social welfare outcomes in a strategic commitment game of incomplete information. In our baseline treatment, players simultaneously commit to either a Hawkish action, which leads to a private payoff, or a Dovish action, which can enhance social welfare. We add a sequential and an endogenous move treatment, where in the former, the first mover is exogenously selected and in the latter, players self-select the order of play. The two additional treatments relax the commitment constraint for the second mover. We find that (i) social welfare is significantly improved in the last two treatments and (ii) the outcome in the endogenous move treatment is mainly driven by gender. Men are willing to play the risky Dovish action more often than women.
Keywords: Gender; type uncertainty; endogenous timing; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D82 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gen and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apc:wpaper:141
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