An exploratory study of how sleep restriction impacts choice in two classic normal form games
No 18-02, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University
We experimentally manipulate sleep levels to examine the impact of sleepiness on strategic oneshot interactions. Where multiple Nash equilibria exist (the Battle-of-the-Sexes game), sleepy subjects play closer to the mixed strategy prediction than do well-rested subjects. When there is a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies (the Penalty Kick game), strategy play of sleepy subject shows indications of reinforcement play. Sleepiness may, at least in some games, promote use of simple heuristics that focus on previous outcomes even when interactions are one-shot. Key Words: Sleep deprivation, game theory, heuristics, experiments
JEL-codes: C92 D91 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-neu
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