Within-group inequality in inter-group competition

Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Abhijit Ramalingam and Brock Stoddard

No 18-17, Working Papers from Department of Economics, Appalachian State University

Abstract: In experiments, contributions to a team public good increase when the team is placed in a competition with another team for prize. This paper is concerned with whether this insight generalises to teams that are internally unequal. In the experiment we report, it does. Indeed, the boost to public goods contributions is bigger with unequal teams than equal ones. We also find that the boost to contributions is most significant among the ‘rich’ in the team. Hence, since the public good is shared equally, competition not only promotes efficiency, it also reduces inequality in our experiment. Key Words: public goods, experiment, team competition, inequality, within group, productivity

JEL-codes: C72 C91 C92 D31 D63 D72 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:apl:wpaper:18-17

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