Stochastic analysis of an agent-based model

A. Veglio and M. Marsili

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We analyze the dynamics of a forecasting game which exhibits the phenomenon of information cascades. Each agent aims at correctly predicting a binary variable and he/she can either look for independent information or herd on the choice of others. We show that dynamics can be analitically described in terms of a Langevin equation and its collective behavior is described by the solution of a Kramers' problem. This provides very accurate results in the region where the vast majority of agents herd, which corresponds to the most interesting one from a game theoretic point of view.

Date: 2007-05
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