Rent seeking games with tax evasion

O. Bundau, M. Neamtu and D. Opris

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider the static and dynamic models of Cournot duopoly with tax evasion. In the dynamic model we introduce the time delay and we analyze the local stability of the stationary state. There is a critical value of the delay when the Hopf bifurcation occurs.

Date: 2007-06
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