EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Wealth distribution in a System with Wealth-limited Interactions

Marisciel L. Palima and Eduardo J. David

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We model a closed economic system with interactions that generates the features of empirical wealth distribution across all wealth brackets, namely a Gibbsian trend in the lower and middle wealth range and a Pareto trend in the higher range, by simply limiting the an agents' interaction to only agents with nearly the same wealth. To do this, we introduce a parameter BETA that limits the range on the wealth of a partner with which an agent is allowed to interact. We show that this wealth-limited interaction is enough to distribute wealth in a purely power law trend. If the interaction is not wealth limited, the wealth distribution is expectedly Gibbsian. The value of BETA where the transition from a purely Gibbsian law to a purely power law distribution happens depends on whether the choice of interaction partner is mutual nor not. For a non-mutual choice, where the richer agent gets to decide, the transition happens at BETA=1.0. For a mutual choice, the transition is at BETA= 0.60. In order to generate a mixed Gibbs-Pareto distribution, we apply another wealth-based rule that depends on the parameter w_limit. An agent whose wealth is below w_limit can choose any partner to interact with, while an agent whose wealth is above w_limit is subject to the wealth-limited range in his choice of partner. A Gibbs-Pareto distribution appears if both these wealth-based rules are applied.

Date: 2007-10
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/0710.1014 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:0710.1014

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:0710.1014