Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model

Georg Zaklan, Frank Westerhoff and Dietrich Stauffer

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We develop a model of tax evasion based on the Ising model. We augment the model using an appropriate enforcement mechanism that may allow policy makers to curb tax evasion. With a certain probability tax evaders are subject to an audit. If they get caught they behave honestly for a certain number of periods. Simulating the model for a range of parameter combinations, we show that tax evasion may be controlled effectively by using punishment as an enforcement mechanism.

Date: 2008-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Analysing tax evasion dynamics via the Ising model (2009)
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