The role of a matchmaker in buyer-vendor interactions

Linyuan L\"u, Matus Medo and Yi-Cheng Zhang

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We consider a simple market where a vendor offers multiple variants of a certain product and preferences of both the vendor and potential buyers are heterogeneous and possibly even antagonistic. Optimization of the joint benefit of the vendor and the buyers turns the toy market into a combinatorial matching problem. We compare the optimal solutions found with and without a matchmaker, examine the resulting inequality between the market participants, and study the impact of correlations on the system.

Date: 2009-02, Revised 2009-07
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Published in European Physical Journal B 71, 565-571 (2009)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:0902.0504

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