Doves and hawks in economics revisited. An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises

Matthias Hanauske (), Jennifer Kunz, Steffen Bernius and Wolfgang K\"onig

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: The last financial and economic crisis demonstrated the dysfunctional long-term effects of aggressive behaviour in financial markets. Yet, evolutionary game theory predicts that under the condition of strategic dependence a certain degree of aggressive behaviour remains within a given population of agents. However, as the consequences of the financial crisis exhibit, it would be desirable to change the 'rules of the game' in a way that prevents the occurrence of any aggressive behaviour and thereby also the danger of market crashes. The paper picks up this aspect. Through the extension of the in literature well-known Hawk-Dove game by a quantum approach, we can show that dependent on entanglement, also evolutionary stable strategies can emerge, which are not predicted by classical evolutionary game theory and where the total economic population uses a non aggressive quantum strategy.

Date: 2009-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-gth and nep-hpe
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Working Paper: Doves and hawks in economics revisited [An evolutionary quantum game theory-based analysis of financial crises] (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:0904.2113

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