Optimal control of a big financial company with debt liability under bankrupt probability constraints

Zongxia Liang and Bin Sun

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: This paper considers an optimal control of a big financial company with debt liability under bankrupt probability constraints. The company, which faces constant liability payments and has choices to choose various production/business policies from an available set of control policies with different expected profits and risks, controls the business policy and dividend payout process to maximize the expected present value of the dividends until the time of bankruptcy. However, if the dividend payout barrier is too low to be acceptable, it may result in the company's bankruptcy soon. In order to protect the shareholders' profits, the managements of the company impose a reasonable and normal constraint on their dividend strategy, that is, the bankrupt probability associated with the optimal dividend payout barrier should be smaller than a given risk level within a fixed time horizon. This paper aims at working out the optimal control policy as well as optimal return function for the company under bankrupt probability constraint by stochastic analysis, PDE methods and variational inequality approach. Moreover, we establish a risk-based capital standard to ensure the capital requirement of can cover the total given risk by numerical analysis and give reasonable economic interpretation for the results.

Date: 2010-07, Revised 2010-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-ias
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