Adaptive Expectations, Confirmatory Bias, and Informational Efficiency

Gani Aldashev, Timoteo Carletti and Simone Righi

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study the informational efficiency of a market with a single traded asset. The price initially differs from the fundamental value, about which the agents have noisy private information (which is, on average, correct). A fraction of traders revise their price expectations in each period. The price at which the asset is traded is public information. The agents' expectations have an adaptive component and a social-interactions component with confirmatory bias. We show that, taken separately, each of the deviations from rationality worsen the information efficiency of the market. However, when the two biases are combined, the degree of informational inefficiency of the market (measured as the deviation of the long-run market price from the fundamental value of the asset) can be non-monotonic both in the weight of the adaptive component and in the degree of the confirmatory bias. For some ranges of parameters, two biases tend to mitigate each other's effect, thus increasing the informational efficiency.

Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta and nep-mic
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Published in 2011), Follies subdued: Informational Efficiency under Adaptive Expectations and Confirmatory Bias, in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, volume 80, Issue 1, pp. 110-121

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