EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

The dynamics of financial stability in complex networks

Jo\~ao P. da Cruz and Pedro G. Lind

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We address the problem of banking system resilience by applying off-equilibrium statistical physics to a system of particles, representing the economic agents, modelled according to the theoretical foundation of the current banking regulation, the so called Merton-Vasicek model. Economic agents are attracted to each other to exchange `economic energy', forming a network of trades. When the capital level of one economic agent drops below a minimum, the economic agent becomes insolvent. The insolvency of one single economic agent affects the economic energy of all its neighbours which thus become susceptible to insolvency, being able to trigger a chain of insolvencies (avalanche). We show that the distribution of avalanche sizes follows a power-law whose exponent depends on the minimum capital level. Furthermore, we present evidence that under an increase in the minimum capital level, large crashes will be avoided only if one assumes that agents will accept a drop in business levels, while keeping their trading attitudes and policies unchanged. The alternative assumption, that agents will try to restore their business levels, may lead to the unexpected consequence that large crises occur with higher probability.

Date: 2011-03, Revised 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban and nep-rmg
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Published in Eur. Phys. J. B (2012) 85: 256

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1103.0717 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1103.0717

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1103.0717