The Emergence of Leadership in Social Networks

T. Clemson and T. S. Evans

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We study a networked version of the minority game in which agents can choose to follow the choices made by a neighbouring agent in a social network. We show that for a wide variety of networks a leadership structure always emerges, with most agents following the choice made by a few agents. We find a suitable parameterisation which highlights the universal aspects of the behaviour and which also indicates where results depend on the type of social network.

Date: 2011-06, Revised 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
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Published in Physica A 391 (2012) 1434-1444

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1106.0296

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