Predatory trading and risk minimisation: how to (b)eat the competition

Anita Mehta

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We present a model of predatory traders interacting with each other in the presence of a central reserve (which dissipates their wealth through say, taxation), as well as inflation. This model is examined on a network for the purposes of correlating complexity of interactions with systemic risk. We suggest the use of selective networking to enhance the survival rates of arbitrarily chosen traders. Our conclusions show that networking with 'doomed' traders is the most risk-free scenario, and that if a trader is to network with peers, it is far better to do so with those who have less intrinsic wealth than himself to ensure individual, and perhaps systemic stability.

Date: 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mon and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1202.1374 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1202.1374

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().