Asymmetric R&D Alliances and Coopetitive Games

Daniela Baglieri, David Carf\`i and Giovanni Battista Dagnino

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper we show how the study of asymmetric R&D alliances, that are those between young and small firms and large and MNEs firms for knowledge exploration and/or exploitation, requires the adoption of a coopetitive framework which consider both collaboration and competition. We draw upon the literature on asymmetric R&D collaboration and coopetition to propose a mathematical model for the coopetitive games which is particularly suitable for exploring asymmetric R&D alliances.

Date: 2012-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ino
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1205.2878

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