High Frequency Market Making

Rene Carmona and Kevin Webster

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Since they were authorized by the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission in 1998, electronic exchanges have boomed, and by 2010 high frequency trading accounted for over 70% of equity trades in the US. Such markets are thought to increase liquidity because of the presence of market makers, who are willing to trade as counterparties at any time, in exchange for a fee, the bid-ask spread. In this paper, we propose an equilibrium model showing how such market makers provide liquidity. The model relies on a codebook for client trades, the implied alpha. After solving the individual clients optimization problems and identifying their implied alphas, we frame the market maker stochastic optimization problem as a stochastic control problem with an infinite dimensional control variable. Assuming either identical time horizons for all the clients, or a stochastic partial differential equation model for their beliefs, we solve the market maker problem and derive tractable formulas for the optimal strategy and the resulting limit-order book dynamics.

Date: 2012-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fmk and nep-mst
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1210.5781

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