Statistical Mechanics of Competitive Resource Allocation using Agent-based Models

Anirban Chakraborti, Damien Challet, Arnab Chatterjee, Matteo Marsili, Yi-Cheng Zhang and Bikas K. Chakrabarti

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Demand outstrips available resources in most situations, which gives rise to competition, interaction and learning. In this article, we review a broad spectrum of multi-agent models of competition (El Farol Bar problem, Minority Game, Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem, Stable marriage problem, Parking space problem and others) and the methods used to understand them analytically. We emphasize the power of concepts and tools from statistical mechanics to understand and explain fully collective phenomena such as phase transitions and long memory, and the mapping between agent heterogeneity and physical disorder. As these methods can be applied to any large-scale model of competitive resource allocation made up of heterogeneous adaptive agent with non-linear interaction, they provide a prospective unifying paradigm for many scientific disciplines.

Date: 2013-05, Revised 2014-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Published in Physics Reports 552 (2015) 1-25

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Working Paper: Statistical mechanics of competitive resource allocation using agent-based models (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1305.2121

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