The Master Equation in Mean Field Theory

Alain Bensoussan, Jens Frehse and Phillip Yam

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Abstract: In his lectures at College de France, P.L. Lions introduced the concept of Master equation, see [5] for Mean Field Games. It is introduced in a heuristic fashion, from the system of partial differential equations, associated to a Nash equilibrium for a large, but finite, number of players. The method, also explained in[2], consists in a formal analogy of terms. The interest of this equation is that it contains interesting particular cases, which can be studied directly, in particular the system of HJB-FP (Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman, Fokker-Planck) equations obtained as the limit of the finite Nash equilibrium game, when the trajectories are independent, see [4]. Usually, in mean field theory, one can bypass the large Nash equilibrium, by introducing the concept of representative agent, whose action is influenced by a distribution of similar agents, and obtains directly the system of HJB-FP equations of interest, see for instance [1]. Apparently, there is no such approach for the Master equation. We show here that it is possible. We first do it for the Mean Field type control problem, for which we interpret completely the Master equation. For the Mean Field Games itself, we solve a related problem, and obtain again the Master equation.

Date: 2014-04, Revised 2014-11
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