An Optimal Consumption-Investment Model with Constraint on Consumption
Zuo Quan Xu and
Fahuai Yi
Papers from arXiv.org
Abstract:
A continuous-time consumption-investment model with constraint is considered for a small investor whose decisions are the consumption rate and the allocation of wealth to a risk-free and a risky asset with logarithmic Brownian motion fluctuations. The consumption rate is subject to an upper bound constraint which linearly depends on the investor's wealth and bankruptcy is prohibited. The investor's objective is to maximize total expected discounted utility of consumption over an infinite trading horizon. It is shown that the value function is (second order) smooth everywhere but a unique possibility of (known) exception point and the optimal consumption-investment strategy is provided in a closed feedback form of wealth, which in contrast to the existing work does not involve the value function. According to this model, an investor should take the same optimal investment strategy as in Merton's model regardless his financial situation. By contrast, the optimal consumption strategy does depend on the investor's financial situation: he should use a similar consumption strategy as in Merton's model when he is in a bad situation, and consume as much as possible when he is in a good situation.
Date: 2014-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-upt
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Citations:
Published in Mathematical Control and Related Fields, Vol.6, No. 3 (2016), 517-534
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1404.7698
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