EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision -- An Agent-based Econophysics Approach

Sascha Hokamp and G. Seibold

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We calculate the dynamics of tax evasion within a multi-agent econophysics model which is adopted from the theory of magnetism and previously has been shown to capture the main characteristics from agent-based based models which build on the standard Allingham and Sandmo approach. In particular, we implement a feedback of public goods provision on the decision-making of selfish agents which aim to pursue their self interest. Our results imply that such a feedback enhances the moral attitude of selfish agents thus reducing the percentage of tax evasion. Two parameters govern the behavior of selfish agents, (i) the rate of adaption to changes in public goods provision and (ii) the threshold of perception of public goods provision. Furtheron we analyze the tax evasion dynamics for different agent co mpositions and under the feedback of public goods provision. We conclude that policymakers may enhance tax compliance behavior via the threshold of perception by means of targeted public relations.

Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-hme, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1409.8528 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision. An Agent-based Econophysics Approach (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1409.8528

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-30
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1409.8528