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Application of the war of attrition game to the analysis of intellectual property disputes

Manuel G. Ch\'avez-Angeles and Patricia S. S\'anchez-Medina

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Abstract: In many developing countries intellectual property infringement and the commerce of pirate goods is an entrepreneurial activity. Digital piracy is very often the only media for having access to music, cinema, books and software. At the same time, bio-prospecting and infringement of indigenous knowledge rights by international consortiums is usual in places with high biodiversity. In these arenas transnational actors interact with local communities. Accusations of piracy often go both ways. This article analyzes the case of southeast Mexico. Using a war of attrition game theory model it explains different situations of intellectual property rights piracy and protection. It analyzes different levels of interaction and institutional settings from the global to the very local. The article proposes free IP zones as a solution of IP disputes. The formation of technological local clusters through Free Intellectual Property Zones (FIPZ) would allow firms to copy and share de facto public domain content for developing new products inside the FIPZ. Enforcement of intellectual property could be pursuit outside of the FIPZ. FIPZ are envisioned as a new type of a sui generis intellectual property regime.

Date: 2015-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-cul, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-knm
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Published in International Journal of Game Theory and Technology (IJGTT), Vol.3, No.1, March 2015

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