A Bayesian Model of the Litigation Game

F. E. Guerra-Pujol

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Abstract: Over a century ago, Oliver Wendell Holmes invited scholars to look at the law through the lens of probability theory: "The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." Yet few legal scholars have taken up this intriguing invitation. As such, in place of previous approaches to the study of law, this paper presents a non-normative, mathematical approach to law and the legal process. Specifically, we present a formal Bayesian model of civil and criminal litigation, or what we refer to as the litigation game; that is, instead of focusing on the rules of civil or criminal procedure or substantive legal doctrine, we ask and attempt to answer a mathematical question: what is the posterior probability that a defendant in a civil or criminal trial will be found liable, given that the defendant has, in fact, committed a wrongful act?

Date: 2015-06
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Published in European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 4, no. 2 (Autumn/Winter 2011), pp. 220-240

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1506.07854

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