Game Design and Analysis for Price based Demand Response: An Aggregate Game Approach

Maojiao Ye and Guoqiang Hu

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In this paper, an aggregate game approach is proposed for the modeling and analysis of energy consumption control in smart grid. Since the electricity user's cost function depends on the aggregate load, which is unknown to the end users, an aggregate load estimator is employed to estimate it. Based on the communication among the users about their estimations on the aggregate load, Nash equilibrium seeking strategies are proposed for the electricity users. By using singular perturbation analysis and Lyapunov stability analysis, a local convergence result to the Nash equilibrium is presented for the energy consumption game that may have multiple Nash equilibria. For the energy consumption game with a unique Nash equilibrium, it is shown that the players' strategies converge to the Nash equilibrium non-locally. More specially, if the unique Nash equilibrium is an inner Nash equilibrium, then the convergence rate can be quantified. Energy consumption game with stubborn players is also investigated. Convergence to the best response strategies for the rational players is ensured. Numerical examples are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

Date: 2015-08, Revised 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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