Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Default under Incomplete Markets

Demian Pouzo and Ignacio Presno

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: In a dynamic economy, we characterize the fiscal policy of the government when it levies distortionary taxes and issues defaultable bonds to finance its stochastic expenditure. Default may occur in equilibrium as it prevents the government from incurring in future tax distortions that would come along with the service of the debt. Households anticipate the possibility of default generating endogenous credit limits. These limits hinder the government's ability to smooth taxes using debt, implying more volatile and less serially correlated fiscal policies, higher borrowing costs and lower levels of indebtedness. In order to exit temporary financial autarky following a default event, the government has to repay a random fraction of the defaulted debt. We show that the optimal fiscal and renegotiation policies have implications aligned with the data.

Date: 2015-08, Revised 2016-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge, nep-pbe and nep-pub
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