On the reversal bias of the Minimax social choice correspondence

Daniela Bubboloni () and Michele Gori

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We introduce three different qualifications of the reversal bias in the framework of social choice correspondences. For each of them, we prove that the Minimax social choice correspondence is immune to it if and only if the number of voters and the number of alternatives satisfy suitable arithmetical conditions. We prove those facts thanks to a new characterization of the Minimax social choice correspondence and using a graph theory approach. We discuss the same issue for the Borda and Copeland social choice correspondences.

Date: 2015-08, Revised 2015-12
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: On the reversal bias of the Minimax social choice correspondence (2016)
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