EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Equilibrium pricing under relative performance concerns

Jana Bielagk, Arnaud Lionnet and Goncalo Dos Reis

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: We investigate the effects of the social interactions of a finite set of agents on an equilibrium pricing mechanism. A derivative written on non-tradable underlyings is introduced to the market and priced in an equilibrium framework by agents who assess risk using convex dynamic risk measures expressed by Backward Stochastic Differential Equations (BSDE). Each agent is not only exposed to financial and non-financial risk factors, but she also faces performance concerns with respect to the other agents. Within our proposed model we prove the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium whose analysis involves systems of fully coupled multi-dimensional quadratic BSDEs. We extend the theory of the representative agent by showing that a non-standard aggregation of risk measures is possible via weighted-dilated infimal convolution. We analyze the impact of the problem's parameters on the pricing mechanism, in particular how the agents' performance concern rates affect prices and risk perceptions. In extreme situations, we find that the concern rates destroy the equilibrium while the risk measures themselves remain stable.

Date: 2015-11, Revised 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1511.04218 Latest version (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:arx:papers:1511.04218

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers from arXiv.org
Bibliographic data for series maintained by arXiv administrators ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-19
Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:1511.04218