Graphical Exchange Mechanisms

Pradeep Dubey, Siddhartha Sahi and Martin Shubik

Papers from arXiv.org

Abstract: Consider an exchange mechanism which accepts diversified offers of various commodities and redistributes everything it receives. We impose certain conditions of fairness and convenience on such a mechanism and show that it admits unique prices, which equalize the value of offers and returns for each individual. We next define the complexity of a mechanism in terms of certain integers $\tau_{ij},\pi_{ij}$ and $k_{i}$ that represent the time required to exchange $i$ for $j$, the difficulty in determining the exchange ratio, and the dimension of the message space. We show that there are a finite number of minimally complex mechanisms, in each of which all trade is conducted through markets for commodity pairs. Finally we consider minimal mechanisms with smallest worst-case complexities $\tau=\max\tau_{ij}$ and $\pi=\max\pi_{ij}$. For $m>3$ commodities, there are precisely three such mechanisms, one of which has a distinguished commodity -- the money -- that serves as the sole medium of exchange. As $m\rightarrow \infty$ the money mechanism is the only one with bounded $\left( \pi ,\tau\right) $.

Date: 2015-12
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Journal Article: Graphical exchange mechanisms (2018)
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